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WHO KILLED MANAGED CARE?  A POLICY WHODUNIT 
PETER D. JACOBSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Accusation 
When I first heard the news that managed care was dead, I could hardly 
believe it.  After all, I was enrolled in a managed care plan and had not 
received any notice that the form of my health care coverage had changed.  Of 
somewhat greater concern, I was worried about what my future health care 
would be and how much it would cost. 
After the initial shock faded, I decided I needed to explore a few questions.  
Most importantly, is managed care really dead?  While I was aware that 
physicians, patients, and the media often reviled managed care, I had no idea it 
was in such dire trouble.  If so, who or what killed managed care and what 
would replace it?  As we will see, this question turned out to be the focus of 
my inquiry. 
The Crime Scene 
As crime scenes go, this one was eerily silent and devoid of direct clues.  I 
looked around, but I was unable to find the body (the corpus delecti).  In most 
crime scenes, there are grieving relatives and friends to console the survivors, 
but no one came to mourn managed care.  Or, if there were mourners, they 
were certainly doing so in private. 
Nonetheless, some circumstantial evidence of managed care’s putative 
demise was not hard to see.  The most obvious was the return of double-digit 
inflation in health care costs.  One of managed care’s greatest successes, 
restraining the growth of health care costs, was in jeopardy, along with 
managed care’s long-term viability.  Perhaps more ominously, managed care 
 
* Associate Professor, Department of Health Management and Policy, University of Michigan 
School of Public Health.  Funding for this research was provided, in part, by a Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation Investigator Award in Health Policy Research.  I wish to thank Deanna 
Hanks, MHSA Candidate at the University of Michigan School of Public Health, for outstanding 
research assistance.  I also thank John Jacobi, J.D., Alan Bloom, J.D., and David Hyman, M.D., 
J.D., for insightful comments on a previous draft. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
366 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:365 
organizations (“MCOs”) seemed to be retrenching on their most coveted cost 
containment programs, such as requiring preauthorization for expensive 
medical procedures, limiting direct access to plan specialists, and contracting 
only with physicians and physician groups meeting the plan’s quality standards 
(known as selective contracting).  Under considerable assault from managed 
care subscribers, the industry was forced to adopt point-of-service plans that 
relaxed some of the more stringent cost controls. 
The assault, however, was not limited to patients.  In fact, there has been a 
backlash from the public and much of the medical community against the 
perceived deficiencies in the managed care approach.1  The signs of backlash 
were evident at the crime scene.  But the problem was that there were too 
many participants to isolate anyone who might have led the backlash and 
committed the murder.  Not just patients, but physicians, hospital 
administrators, judges, politicians, and the media were all complicit in the 
backlash.  How to sort out each of their respective contributions promised to be 
a major problem of this investigation.  Indeed, how did the managed care 
industry ever manage to engender such widespread hostility?  Curiously, 
despite the forces arrayed against it, the perpetrators of the backlash have not 
been able to enact the one piece of legislation designed to address the 
perceived deficiencies: the patients’ bill of rights.  This bill would guarantee 
patient access to independent grievance processes and direct access to 
specialists.  This failure should give one pause before declaring managed 
care’s demise. 
One final piece of evidence should be noted.  Under cover of the managed 
care backlash, physicians and hospitals began to reassert their prerogatives.  
With the erosion of stringent cost controls, physicians gained greater leverage 
in clinical decisions.  Likewise, hospital administrators pushed through 
payment increases that had been all but impossible during the few years that 
managed care was ascendant. 
The absence of clues and witnesses made it difficult to identify the 
perpetrator and the motives.  As I would soon learn, there were plenty of 
suspects with myriad motives for wishing managed care’s demise.  But at this 
point, both the perpetrator and the motive were neither identifiable nor 
obvious.  Beyond that, it was not even clear how managed care died.  What act 
killed it?  Three possibilities occurred to me.  First, that it was simply a death 
by natural causes.  This made sense because the crime scene lacked any indicia 
of foul play.  From that observation, a second possibility followed—that 
managed care died of self-inflicted wounds.  Given my sense that managed 
care offered a good product that had not been implemented as well as it might 
have been, this seemed a strong possibility. 
 
 1. For a comprehensive discussion of the backlash, see the articles collected in 24 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 653-1420 (1999). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] WHO KILLED MANAGED CARE? 367 
Yet, I could not rule out a third, and perhaps more intriguing scenario—
that managed care was murdered.  At first, this seemed a bit far-fetched.  As 
the behemoth of health care delivery since the mid-1990s, it would be difficult 
for any suspect to have the means to slay such a large enterprise.  And even if 
the actor had the means, how could this be done so silently as to leave no overt 
clues?  With all of the public and scholarly attention to managed care, patients’ 
rights, and so forth, it seems preposterous to think that managed care could be 
killed so effectively without leaving a trace as to the killer’s identity.  And 
yet. . . . 
The Suspects 
It did not take long to conjure up a list of suspects who had no love for 
managed care and might even revel in its demise.  But would they actually be 
so brazen as to commit or be complicit in murdering managed care? 
Physicians and patients were the most obvious suspects.  Each group had 
reason to kill managed care—physicians for loss of autonomy and patients for 
the perceived loss of access to needed services.  But we cannot forget about 
politicians.  Both state and federal legislators had their own reasons for 
controlling managed care.  The judicial system would be at the top of some 
observers’ lists of suspects.  Since the judiciary was initially hostile to 
incursions on physician autonomy, several scholars argued that the courts 
would undermine managed care’s cost containment initiatives. 
A prime suspect could well be the media.  From the managed care 
industry’s perspective, the media irresponsibly portrayed a few horror stories 
as indicative of all managed care operations.  In the industry’s view, the media 
has ignored managed care’s positive attributes of being a needed corrective to 
the excesses of the fee-for-service system. 
Less obvious suspects included health insurers, employers, and hospitals.  
As we will see, each of these actors has mixed motives for killing managed 
care.  Although health insurers might benefit from less competition, they need 
to worry that the carnage would spill over to them.  Employers certainly want 
to see lower health care costs, but they also want to satisfy their employees.  If 
employers receive too many complaints about managed care, their support for 
cost containment programs may quickly attenuate.  Hospitals also have mixed 
motives.  As contractors for managed care patients, hospitals have an interest 
in cooperating with the managed care industry.  But as hospital revenues 
declined under pressure from MCOs, hospitals needed to fight back to 
maintain their economic viability. 
Each of these suspects has reason to celebrate the end of managed care.  
Could any of them individually kill managed care?  Probably not.  More likely, 
perhaps they secretly colluded to destroy managed care.  Even if there was no 
collusion, there may well have been support as each suspect attacked one piece 
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of managed care’s operations.  At a minimum, no one defended managed care 
against these attacks. 
The Background 
Anyone with even a passing interest in health care delivery learns 
immediately that the U.S. health care system is in trouble.  Take, for example, 
the three main public policy concerns of costs, quality, and access.  After a 
short period during the 1990s in which cost increases were limited, health care 
costs are once again escalating at double-digit rates.  Despite ongoing efforts to 
improve overall quality of care, many observers complain that quality remains 
a problem.  And the rising number of people without health insurance remains 
an intractable social problem. 
From the rise of modern medicine to prominence after World War II until 
the early 1990s, health care delivery and health policy were largely dominated 
by physicians.2  In the fee-for-service model, there was very little interference 
on physician autonomy from payers, hospital administrators, or patients.  The 
costs of care mattered little to either patients or physicians.  Except for the 
premium charge, the entire health care bill was paid by a third party insurer.  
No one in the system had an incentive to control costs.3 
Managed care revolutionized health care delivery by combining the 
financing and medical (clinical) aspects into one package.4  Instead of paying a 
fee for each service, the patient subscribes to a managed care plan for a 
monthly fee that covers and provides a defined set of benefits.  For each visit 
or service, patients make an additional co-payment of $10 or $20.  At the heart 
of managed care is the promise that a new approach could lower costs by 
imposing restraints on the amount of care provided without sacrificing quality 
of care.  To do so, managed care initiated the widespread use of cost-
containment practices designed to reduce the costs of health care by 
encouraging providers to limit medical treatment.  These practices range from 
aggressive utilization management to capitated funding arrangements, 
limitations on choice of providers, limitations on benefits (for example, ten 
physical therapy visits), exclusive contracting arrangements, and other 
 
 2. For an excellent and thorough history, see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982). 
 3. Economists term this “moral hazard.”  See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 290-91 (1982).  Moral hazard is defined as changes in behavior as a 
result of insurance or other mechanism protecting individuals from the consequences of their 
actions.  An example of a moral hazard is that some will drive recklessly if they think that safety 
devices, such as anti-lock brakes, will protect them. 
 4. This is a far more transformative departure than the shift from in-office physician care to 
hospitals as the locus of health care delivery because it changes all aspects of the health care 
enterprise.  See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. 
denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] WHO KILLED MANAGED CARE? 369 
financial incentives such as bonuses and withholds.  While these techniques 
are now also used by commercial insurers, managed care providers have been 
more aggressive in using them to reduce costs. 
Many commentators believed that managed care would be the savior—the 
free market alternative to the governmental takeover by the Clinton 
Administration’s proposed Health Security Act.  With hindsight, it seems clear 
that the managed care concept, however sound, suffered from excessively high 
expectations that were impossible to meet.  Those expectations were most 
manifest during the 1994 debate over the Clinton Administration’s proposed 
Health Security Act.  At the heart of the debate was the lack of consensus over 
whether health care should be left to the private sector to be run by 
marketplace rules, or should involve significant regulatory oversight.  After the 
media creatively pilloried the Health Security Act as a governmental takeover 
of the health care system, the Act was resoundingly defeated. 
In retrospect, it seems clear that in the 1994 policy debate, the country 
decided to religion market mechanisms to shape our health care delivery 
system as opposed to relying on government to redress the perceived 
deficiencies of the health care system.  For a time, the market indeed achieved 
what competitive markets are best at doing, relentlessly reducing the cost 
excesses of the old health care order.  But reliance on the market had other 
consequences the public found troublesome, and managed care was declared 
dead.5  Whether dead or merely dying (reports of its death may well be 
premature), a crime (murder or at least attempted murder) was committed that I 
am determined to solve.  Keep in mind that, even if managed care disappears 
tomorrow, the health policy dilemma will remain what it was at the start of the 
managed care era: how to contain the high cost of health care without unduly 
limiting individual access to needed health care services. 
THE SUSPECTS: MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY 
This story has numerous suspects, but no heroes.  Even the sleuths, the 
academic community (and other health policy observers), have not always 
clarified the complex developments that seem overwhelming to most patients.  
Nonetheless, the job of explaining who killed managed care is well-suited to 
the academic community.  Before determining who killed managed care, I 
analyzed each suspect’s motives and opportunities for wanting to see managed 
care eliminated.  As we will see, finding many suspects with both motive and 
opportunity was relatively easy.  Eliminating suspects and finding the true 
culprit proved much more difficult. 
 
 5. James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622, 2623 (2001); 
Katherine Swartz, The Death of Managed Care as We Know It, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
1201, 1202 (1999).  This claim is ahead of itself.  There are still several large MCOs, including 
Kaiser-Permanence, United Healthcare, Aetna, etc.  Smaller plans may be more vulnerable. 
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Physicians 
The logical starting place among the numerous suspects for the 
investigation is with physicians.  Historically, physicians have dominated, 
defined, and shaped health care delivery.  But what exactly is their relationship 
to the victim?  What would they gain from the demise of managed care?  
What, in short, is their motive? 
Motive.  Managed care changes the physician’s role in health care delivery 
in ways that provide a clear motive for wanting managed care to disappear.  
Although many physicians have adapted to the managed care environment, the 
profession, as a whole, remains resistant to managed care because it upsets the 
profession’s traditional control over medical practice. 
Historically, the attributes of medical practice included professional 
dominance, where physicians controlled the allocation of health care resources.  
At the heart of the clinical encounter was professional autonomy—physicians 
alone made medical decisions, with insurers paying for the recommended 
treatment.  Physicians alone controlled access to private health information 
upon which medical decisions were made.  In addition, physicians achieved 
considerable social status and economic attainment.  All of this was diminished 
by managed care. 
In a relatively short period of time, managed care challenged and 
undermined each of these core doctrines.  Most importantly, the physician-
patient relationship is no longer sacrosanct.  Physicians no longer dominate 
health care delivery, but are subordinate to the managed care industry.  
Concepts such as preauthorization, utilization review, and economic incentives 
to reduce the cost of health care compromised physician autonomy.  Clinical 
decisions must be “authorized” based on coverage limits, formularies, or 
worse, the opinion of an authorizing managed care agent (usually a non-
physician, nurse or clerk, for the initial approval).  One scholar refers to this 
process as the “1-800-MOTHER-MAY-I model of telephone approval.”6  The 
process shakes the foundation of physician autonomy, imposes resource-
consuming and vexing bureaucracy on medical practice, and necessitates a 
frustrating exercise for the practitioner.  But physicians are still responsible 
both legally and ethically to act in a patient’s best interests.  This squeeze 
between patient demands for more care and MCOs’ demands to reduce costs 
created a fundamental ethical dilemma not present in fee-for-service medicine. 
Another factor is the capitation method of reimbursement initiated by 
managed care.  Under capitation, a physician (or physicians’ group) receives a 
flat, per member, per month fee to manage the care.  If there is a surplus, the 
physician retains the money; but if there is a shortfall, the physician absorbs 
the risk.  Aside from the inevitable squeeze capitation places on physicians’ 
 
 6. Harold S. Luft, Why are Physicians So Upset About Managed Care?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L.  957, 963 (1999). 
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revenue, the physician faces increasing liability exposure to the patient without 
being able to control how resources are allocated. 
In view of these changes, it is hardly surprising that physician satisfaction  
substantially declined.  Research indicates that primary care physicians’ 
perception of clinical autonomy is negatively correlated to the proportion of 
Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) patients in their practices.7  
“[O]nly 18 percent of practicing physicians indicated that they held a positive 
view of the changes occurring in the health care system.”8  Only sixty-five 
percent (65%) of physicians surveyed expressed satisfaction with practicing in 
a managed care HMO environment.9  Employed physicians in group or staff 
model HMOs are not statistically more dissatisfied than independently 
practicing physicians.  Primary care physicians whose income is derived from 
capitated managed care contracts are significantly more dissatisfied than 
primary care physicians who do not receive capitated income.10 
Opportunity.  There is no shortage of evidence of grumbling, complaining, 
and effective character assassination by physicians about managed care.  Nor is 
there any shortage of opportunities to sabotage the managed care.  But does it 
add up to a deathblow?  Although it seems unlikely that physicians retained the 
political or social power to single-handedly kill managed care, it seems very 
plausible that physician opposition to managed care’s cost containment 
initiatives contributed significantly to the industry’s demise. 
At a minimum, physicians provided some of the most vociferous 
opposition to managed care that contributed to the public backlash beginning 
in the mid-1990s.  No one has attempted to quantify physicians’ influence on 
the backlash, but a look at the activities, policies, politics, and positions of the 
American Medical Association (“AMA”) is quite revealing.  The medical 
profession historically has taken the position that it alone is trained and 
sufficiently competent to police physicians and, consequently, medical policy 
must derive solely from the physician community.  The AMA has a long and 
distinguished track record of politically championing these interests of the 
profession.  As a result, the AMA has opposed non-physician control over 
medical decisions, dating from the emergence of pre-paid health care in the 
1930s and continuing through the advent of managed care.  Its current strategy 
includes a web-based managed care complaint box for physicians to file their 
managed care woes to serve as evidence in the on-going feud.11 
 
 7. Sharon B. Buchbinder et al., Managed Care and Primary Care Physicians’ Overall 
Career Satisfaction, 28 J. HEALTH FIN. 35, 36-37 (2001). 
 8. Mike Magee & Mohammadreza Hojat, Impact of Health Care System on Physicians’ 
Discontent, 26 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 357, 358 (2001). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Buchbinder et al., supra note 7, at 42. 
 11. Amy Snow Landa, AMA to Catalog Doctors’ Woes on Health Plans, AM. MED. NEWS, 
Dec. 10, 2001, at 6. 
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Yet the AMA’s ability to block the erosion of physician autonomy and the 
rise of managed care has diminished steadily since the 1970s.  The diminished 
political clout limits the profession’s ability to enact legislation blocking 
managed care’s cost containment programs or protecting physician autonomy.  
As one scholar notes, “Once deferential to professional guidance in 
policymaking, politicians now have begun to question and even alter organized 
medicine’s political stances.”12  The outcome was a diminution of 
membership, solidarity, and political allies.  State chapters, medical societies, 
and competing organizations stepped in to fill niche vacuums.  By the 1980s, 
when managed care was wreaking havoc on physicians’ practices and incomes, 
the AMA no longer wielded the political clout to forge alliances and bring 
about the death of managed care. 
The result of this loss of political power can be seen at both state and 
federal legislatures, which limits the profession’s opportunity to sabotage 
managed care.  For example, despite the AMA’s persistent support for a 
federal patients’ bill of rights (which would help restore physician autonomy), 
Congress failed to enact a federal patients’ bill of rights.  At the state level, 
however, physicians have been somewhat more successful in enacting 
legislation that protects their interests.13 
That is not to say that the physician community, and even the AMA, has 
not attempted to undermine managed care.  Physicians responded to the 
business of managed care with business tactics of their own.  The earliest 
managed care visionaries described a system with a rich, broad group of 
primary and specialty care providers who assume the responsibility for 
comprehensive, high quality care of a defined population.14  Unfortunately, the 
realization of that model left the majority of providers, especially Primary Care 
Physicians (“PCPs”), who were in solo or small practices, disenfranchised and 
impotent in negotiations with behemoth insurers-turned-MCOs.  These 
physicians abandoned their entrepreneurial practices, often under pressure and 
with deep regret, and merged with hospitals in Integrated Delivery Systems 
(“IDS”), Physician Hospital Organizations (“PHO”), Independent Physician 
Associations (“IPA”), and a plethora of other larger organizational forms.  This 
gave physicians the scale and scope necessary to get in the game with the 
giants like Aetna, United Healthcare, and Cigna.  Eventually, physicians 
 
 12. Mark Schlesinger, A Loss of Faith: The Sources of Reduced Political Legitimacy for the 
American Medical Profession, 80 MILBANK Q. 185, 186 (2002).  See also Mark A. Peterson, 
From Trust to Political Power: Interest Groups, Public Choice, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 1145 (2001) (describing the political power and efficaciousness of the AMA 
through the 1960s and the factors thereafter that disrupted the old power relationships). 
 13. See discussion infra pp. 382-83 regarding willing provider laws. 
 14. See Alain C. Enthoven & Carol B. Vorhaus, A Vision of Quality in Health Care 
Delivery, HEALTH AFF., May-June 1997, at 45; Andy Pasternak, Jackson Hole Revisited, at 
http://www.healthleaders.com/magazine/feature1.php?contentid=20048 (June 1, 2001). 
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learned to effectively negotiate managed care contracts, but not without many 
casualties in the learning process.  More recently, the number of physicians 
accepting capitation is in a downward trend and those that do accept capitation 
are savvier than before.15  The trend away from capitation increased 
physicians’ leverage against MCOs.  As one managed care executive said, “We 
asked our doctors to act like insurance companies; that didn’t work well.”16 
Patients 
The next most obvious suspects are managed care’s patients.  They are at 
the locus of all the disparate competing interests and are most affected by 
managed care’s cost controls when they are vulnerable and needy.  Could their 
frustration have culminated in murder? 
Motive.  The horror stories about managed care’s deficiencies are easy to 
find.  A Kentucky woman with a precancerous cervical lesion successfully 
sued her managed care company for more than $13 million, virtually all in 
punitive damages, when the managed care company refused the ob-gyn’s 
recommended treatment.17  A court granted class action status to a lawsuit 
stemming “from improper denial of medical coverage” when a Prudential 
Concurrent Review Nurse countermanded the patient’s physician’s orders for 
ninety-six hours post-surgical hospitalization following removal of two tumors 
weighing more than 3½ pounds.18  United Healthcare discontinued in-patient 
coverage for a woman with a high-risk pregnancy in her last weeks contrary to 
her wishes and her physician’s orders.19  Consequently, her baby died in utero, 
but she was denied a C-section and must wait days to deliver her dead infant.20 
Are these cases representative of most patients’ experiences?  If they are, it 
easily provides a motive for murder.  Or are there other forces and factors that 
cumulatively constitute a motive for murder?  According to many observers, 
 
 15. J.A. Jacob, Fewer Physician Groups Accept Capitation, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 5, 2001, 
at 20.  Interestingly, recent data shows that although physicians are generally participating in 
managed care capitation arrangements, those who do accept capitation are making more money 
and their capitation income represents a larger portion of their total income.  Ken Terry, Managed 
Care: Could You Live Without It?, MED. ECON., Dec. 3, 2001, at 26. 
 16. Leigh Page, Capitation at the Crossroads, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 5, 2001, at 17, 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_01/bisa0305.htm (Mar. 5, 2001) 
(quoting Stanley Borg of Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Colorado).  Of course, 
physicians could refuse to participate in managed care arrangements, but few can afford to do so. 
 17. Robert Lowes, Straightforward UR—or a “Machine of Denial”?, MED. ECON., May 8, 
2000, at 180. 
 18. AIS Managed Care, HMO Lawsuit Watch: Batas v. The Prudentail [sic] Ins. Co., at 
http://www.aishealth.com/ManagedCare/HMOLawsuitWatch/Bates.html; Batas v. Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am., 724 N.Y.S.2d 3, 9-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). 
 19. Melanie Eversley, Grieving Mom an Icon for Patients’ Rights; Out of Baby’s Death 
Came HMO Crusade, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 23, 2002, at 1A. 
 20. Id. 
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actual health outcomes—an attempt at measuring quality of care—are not 
appreciably different between MCOs and fee-for-services providers.  As one 
scholar notes, “[n]or is it true that we’re any sicker now from all this managed 
care and denial of services and so on.”21  If this is correct, what is the source of 
patients’ state of mind regarding their experiences with managed care? 
Several factors contribute to patients’ perceived antipathy.  For one, as 
discussed below, media reports tend to emphasize managed care’s failures 
without describing managed care’s successes.  For another, many people may 
derive their aversion to managed care based on reports from others rather than 
on personal experiences.22  Beyond these considerations, the shift from fee-for-
service medicine to managed care has been jarring for many patients.  In 
contrast to the relatively simple world before managed care, where physicians 
recommended treatment and insurers paid, managed care offers patients a 
bewildering array of acronyms and concepts that even specialists sometimes 
have trouble characterizing.  In fee-for-service, patients expected almost 
unlimited care where cost was rarely an issue (for those with insurance 
coverage).  As will be described below, the managed care industry did little to 
explain the concept to the public and  provided the public with little or no input 
into the design or implementation of cost control programs.  And the industry 
has been remiss in not offering formal grievance mechanisms for patients to 
contest delayed or denied care. 
Polls vary widely in measuring patient satisfaction with managed care.  A 
review of health care policy public opinion polls over a fifty-year period 
concludes: 
[T]he American public has conflicting views about the nation’s health policy.  
They report much dissatisfaction with the health care system and with private 
health insurance and managed care companies, and they indicate general 
support of a national health plan.  However, most Americans remain satisfied 
with their current medical arrangements, do not trust the federal government to 
do what is right, and do not favor a single-payer type of national health plan.  
The review also finds that confidence in the leaders of medicine has declined 
but that most Americans maintain trust in the honesty and ethical standards of 
individual physicians.23 
 
 21. Gina Kolata, A Conversation with: Victor Fuchs; An Economist’s View of Health Care 
Reform, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2000, at F6.  Other prominent analysts agree.  See, e.g., Robert H. 
Miller & Harold S. Luft, Does Managed Care Lead to Better or Worse Quality of Care?: A 
Survey of Recent Studies Shows Mixed Results on Managed Care Plan Performance, HEALTH 
AFF., May-June 1997, at 7. 
 22. Gail R. Wilensky, What’s Behind the Public’s Backlash?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
1015, 1016 (1999). 
 23. Robert J. Blendon & John M. Benson, Americans’ Views on Health Policy: A Fifty-Year 
Historical Perspective, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 33. 
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Given these somewhat conflicting viewpoints, there are, nonetheless, some 
noteworthy consistencies.  One study found that among 827 Californians there 
was a correlation of lower satisfaction with their health plans and little or no 
choice among provider-sponsored health plans.24  The study reported that 
nationwide in 1999 approximately half of individuals covered by employer-
sponsored plans had no choice or limited choice of health plans.25  These 
findings are generally consistent with other recent nationwide research.26  We 
can reasonably infer from the polling noted above that patients trust their 
doctors, but do not equally trust either big government or institutional health 
care providers (that is, MCOs).  In fact, hospitals, representing direct health 
care services, rank very high in consumer satisfaction, while managed care 
companies rank lowest.  Limiting access to the physicians in whom patients 
place their trust clearly creates a fertile environment for discontent. 
Opportunity.  The lack of choice, resentment over restrictions on health 
care, and anecdotal horror stories give patients sufficient motive for homicide.  
But patients have fewer opportunities than physicians to strike the deathblow.  
Like physicians, patient dissatisfaction was an integral part of the managed 
care backlash, especially taking their complaints to the media.  Unlike 
physicians, patients have only limited ability to influence legislation. 
Groups such as the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”), 
Families USA, California Health Decisions, numerous local and regional 
health care consumer advocacy organizations, as well as state ombudsmen 
services, all attempt to represent the patient perspective and interests in health 
care delivery.  Notwithstanding the work of each of these groups, patients 
remain a highly fragmented group without an effective, collective voice or role 
in influencing managed care policy.  One observer writes: 
When decisions are made about healthcare policy, procedures or processes, the 
consumer’s point of view is somehow lost.  Patient satisfaction surveys rarely 
probe for answers that reveal the patient’s real beliefs.  Employer coalitions 
don’t often invite member/employee/consumers to participate.  And they rarely 
represent public sector populations such as Medicaid recipients.  As valuable 
as such efforts are, they are not enough to give us consumer-driven solutions to 
the problems in managed care.27 
 
 24. Alain C. Enthoven et al., Consumer Choice and the Managed Care Backlash, 27 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 1, 4, 6 (2001). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Wilensky, supra note 22, at 1018; Kenneth E. Thorpe, Managed Care as Victim or 
Villain?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 949, 951 (1999). 
 27. Ellen B. Severoni, How to Keep Patients, Plans and Purchasers in the Loop, MANAGED 
HEALTHCARE, Feb. 1, 1999, at 50, 50.  Professor Marc Rodwin has written extensively about the 
need for a more effective consumer voice in managed care policies.  See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, 
Exit and Voice in American Health Care, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1041 (1999) [hereinafter 
Rodwin, Exit and Voice in American Health Care]; Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and 
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Perhaps the most effective patients’ response to their complaints about 
managed care is to switch their health care coverage away from traditional 
managed care plans to other alternatives, such as Preferred Provider 
Organizations (“PPOs”) and Point-of-Service Plans (“POSs”).28  POS plans in 
particular allow patients more flexibility in seeing specialists, hence eroding 
MCO’s stringent cost controls.  Employees have encouraged employers to 
offer alternatives to managed care plans. 
Employers 
The impact of the employers’ role is not as readily apparent as patients or 
physicians.  In many ways employers determine the types of insurance 
coverage available and the price employees will pay because most people 
receive health insurance through their employer.  The reality of modern health 
care purchasing is that employees have only a limited voice in the benefits 
available and employers might not purchase benefits individual employees 
would select on their own.29 
After World War II, health benefits became “a job entitlement . . . because 
health coverage became a corporate practice to entice scarce workers under 
wage controls during World War II and in the boom years that followed—and 
is now given tax-free to employees.”30  This places employers in a somewhat 
conflicted position.  On the one hand, employers act as the employee’s agent in 
selecting available insurance coverage options.  On the other hand, employers 
have their own economic interests at stake.  Thus, employers may favor 
options that are less desirable to employees. 
Motive.  If anything, employers have a strong interest in facilitating 
managed care’s success.  Since the premise of managed care is that it can 
reduce costs while maintaining or even improving quality of care, employers 
would not be well-served by its untimely demise.  On the contrary, managed 
care allows large employers to keep their health benefits’ costs manageable.  
The promise was that if business practices and processes were applied to the 
 
Managed Care: The Need for Organized Consumers, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 110. 
 28. Rodwin, Exit and Voice in American Health Care, supra note 27, at 1055. 
 29. Empirical evidence on the employee-employer agency relationship is mixed.  Pamela B. 
Peele et al., Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Are Employers Good Agents for Their 
Employees?, 78 MILBANK Q. 5, 16-17 (2000) (reported survey and focus group results showing 
that employers may act as good agents for employees, in particular that employees would not be 
better served by purchasing their health insurance directly).  But see Mark W. Legnini et al., 
HEALTH AFF., May-June 2000, at 173, 175 (finding that this might not hold for small employers).  
See also Dennis P. Scanlon et al., Consumer Health Plan Choice: Current Knowledge and Future 
Directions, 18 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 507, 508, 524 (1997) (reporting limited employer 
involvement in helping employees to interpret quality of care report cards). 
 30. Richard J. Mahoney, Missing in Action: The Health Care Consumer, DIRECTORSHIP, 
Oct. 1999, at 1. 
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delivery of health care, costs could be brought under control.  Consequently, 
managed care products rapidly proliferated as employers anticipated cost-
control relief.  Unfortunately, the medical “march of science” and other factors 
continued to drive costs up, eroding managed care’s ability to restrain cost 
increases.  Managed care premium rates increased 15.3% for 2002 and are 
expected to increase another twenty-two percent (22%) for 2003, with little or 
no room for employers of any size negotiating more favorable rate increases.31 
The motive for undermining managed care occurs when employees express 
their dissatisfaction with their MCO choices.  In a delicate balancing act, 
employers must weigh their cost concerns against employee complaints.  This 
was especially true during the booming economy of the mid-to-late 1990s.  
During this period, employers competing for human resources knew that health 
care benefits were crucial to attracting and retaining a quality workforce.  A 
“study of 528 U.S. employees found health care ranks as the most important 
benefit, outscoring compensation by a margin of two to one.”32  So if you are 
an employer in a globally competitive marketplace, how do you resolve the 
runaway costs and employee expectations of quality, choice, and self-
determination?  Given these staggering financial assaults on profitability, could 
it be that employers are the guilty parties and are responsible for the murder? 
Opportunity.  Despite their mixed motives, employers have had numerous 
opportunities to sabotage managed care.  The employers’ primary contribution 
to managed care’s travails was their inability to demand that MCOs adhere to 
stringent cost containment programs.  Instead, employers succumbed to 
employee dissatisfaction in two ways.  First, employers failed to restrict the 
number and types of benefit choices.  Employers began offering PPOs and 
POSs that, as noted above, operated to reduce the managed care industry’s 
ability to restrain cost increases.  In addition, employers did little to educate 
their workers for the need for cost containment and why managed care was the 
best vehicle for achieving a more stable health care environment.  Second, 
business health purchasing coalitions were unable to use their combined 
leverage to ensure the promised cost constraints coupled with improved quality 
of care.33 
To reduce their costs, employers are now seeking alternatives to the 
current system of providing health insurance benefits, primarily by opting for 
plans that would shift costs back to the employee or patient.  Some employers 
are considering providing a fixed amount of money for health benefits (called 
 
 31. Press Release, Hewitt Associates, HMO Rates Continue to Rise at Double Digit Pace, at 
http://was.hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/newsroom/pressrel/2002/06-04-02.htm (June 4, 2002). 
 32. Press Release, Hewitt Associates, Employees Rank Health Care as Number One Benefit 
and Want More Control and Choice, at http://was.hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/newsroom/pressrel/ 
2002/02-25-02.htm  (Feb. 25, 2002). 
 33. See, e.g., JACK A. MEYER ET AL., EMPLOYER COALITION INITIATIVES IN HEALTH CARE 
PURCHASING (1996). 
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defined contribution programs) and allowing employees to shop for their own 
health care coverage.34  Defined contribution programs shift more of the health 
care cost to employees than under the current defined benefits system, where 
most of the cost is absorbed by employers.  Defined contribution plans are a 
method where “employers give employees more choice and control of their 
health care, but set employer contributions at a fixed dollar amount and expect 
employees to pay premium costs above that amount.”35  The changes to health 
care delivery that lurk within the defined contribution strategy have the 
potential to destroy managed care once and for all.  Patients would choose their 
own physicians, contracting for favorable negotiated rates.  Capitation would 
be nearly impossible at the individual level. 
If successful, this would certainly influence the structure and operation of 
MCOs because it would make managed care, already suspect to many 
employees, even less attractive.  As part of the strategy, employees’ copays for 
doctor visits, emergency room services, prescription drugs, and specialist visits 
have all increased.  The goal is to shift costs away from the employer and to 
sensitize employees to the cost of their health care consumption.  It could have 
that potential.  But, according to insurance insiders, “[n]ewfangled consumer-
driven health plans, which allow individuals to customize their own benefits 
packages, have yet to catch fire.”36 
A shift from seemingly unlimited paternalistic health care financing 
management to consumers determining and designing their own health care 
plan is loaded with challenges and obstacles.  One obstacle is educating 
employees in effectively analyzing plan benefits and options and making 
decisions that fit their needs.  This creates a huge support burden for 
employers’ human resource staffs.  Another more potentially damaging 
obstacle is simply creating a new flavor of backlash.  Employees may quickly 
discern that they are assuming significantly more risk and cost along with 
added choice.  Employers could quickly find themselves more desperate for 
solutions than they currently are. 
To their credit, employers have renewed their collective interest in using 
their leverage to impose quality of care improvements.  Several new strategies 
have emerged through organizations such as the Leapfrog Group.  For 
example, these groups are insisting that providers adhere to evidence-based 
 
 34. For a discussion of the defined contribution strategy, see Stephen Blakely, Defined 
Contribution Health Benefits: The Next Evolution?, EBRI NOTES, Aug. 2001, at 1; John V. 
Jacobi & Nicole Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability, and Disintermediation in 
Managed Care,  29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 305 (2001) 
 35. Julie A. Jacob, Consumer-Driven Health Plans Could Mean End of Capitation, AM. 
MED. NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 15, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/ 
pick_01/bisa0813.htm. 
 36. Karen Pallarito, Health Care Inflation May Mean Workers Share Costs, REUTERS, at 
http://www.clarian.org/content/reuters/037_06062002.jhtml (last updated June 6, 2002). 
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medicine standards and increasingly expect that MCOs include disease 
management plans in their products.  Disease management entails a focus on 
the common diseases responsible for the majority of health care costs.37  
Managed care companies concentrate management of these conditions on a 
case-by-case basis and implement a variety of monitoring mechanisms ranging 
from telephone calls with nurses to electronic monitoring of critical indicators, 
such as weight and blood pressure.  One can hardly consider disease 
management as a deathblow to managed care.  Instead, it may arguably 
reinforce the concepts inherent in managed care. 
In the final analysis, employers have and continue to use their clout to pose 
a threat to managed care, but we still have no more than circumstantial 
evidence that they perpetrated the crime. 
Courts 
At the dawn of the modern managed care industry, many doubted whether 
the courts would support managed care’s cost containment programs.  After 
all, neither the courts nor the legislative branch welcomed previous attempts to 
impose institutional controls over physicians.  The legal system relied on the 
corporate practice of medicine doctrine to block institutional controls.  One 
study of previous efforts in the fee-for-service system to limit costs and 
physician autonomy led to the ominous prediction that the cost containment 
innovations in managed care would not survive judicial scrutiny.38  To many 
observers, the courts were poised to disrupt the core premises of the new 
managed care industry’s financial incentives.39  Without doubt, these 
predictions were based on sound interpretation of judicial attitudes at that time.  
What the scholars were unable to account for were changes in judicial 
attitudes, fundamental ways in which managed care cases would depart from 
fee-for-service litigation, and how the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act (“ERISA”) would undercut all previous perceptions. 
Motive.  Thus, the judicial motive to attack managed care is not 
diabolical.Rather, the court’s motive is to play its traditional oversight role in 
 
 37. The benefits executive at Calpers (California Public Employees’ Retirement System), 
Allen Feezor, claims that sixty percent (60%) of health care costs are attributable to eighteen (18) 
chronic diseases.  Milt Freudenheim, A Changing World Is Forcing Changes on Managed Care, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at A1. 
 38. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health 
Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988).  For a more detailed analysis of the role 
of the courts in shaping health care delivery and policy, see PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN 
THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED CARE ERA (2000) [hereinafter JACOBSON, 
STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT]. 
 39. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Models of Rationing: Health Insurers’ 
Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992); John H. Ferguson et al., 
Court-Ordered Reimbursement for Unproven Medical Technology, 269 JAMA 2116 (1993). 
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economic and social relations and in interpreting congressional statutes.  
Although state courts tend to favor individual litigants, the historical 
development of common law suggests that courts move slowly to impose 
liability on a new industry such as managed care.40  In this case, liability 
principles already applicable to hospitals might be applied to managed care 
litigation. 
One would also expect jurors to be sympathetic to patient challenges given 
the managed care backlash, especially at the beginning of the litigation cycle.  
If given the chance, I suspect that jurors would indeed punish MCOs for 
denying care.  But ERISA preemption has limited the ability to take cases to 
state court juries, leaving open the question of how jurors would respond if 
ERISA preemption were eliminated. 
Opportunity.41  Regardless of potential motives, courts, especially federal, 
have had considerable opportunity to derail managed care.  All it would take is 
for courts to rule that managed care’s cost containment programs and financial 
incentives can be challenged in state courts.  The cases decided so far suggest 
that courts are not systematically impeding the implementation of cost 
containment initiatives.  Instead, courts have relied on ERISA preemption to 
limit patients’ state tort litigation against MCOs.  This limits the ability of state 
courts, which might otherwise be receptive to patients’ lawsuits, to impose 
significant damages or restrictions on managed care operations.  The 
conventional wisdom that the courts would undermine cost containment 
initiatives has not happened.  Whatever problems the managed care industry 
faces, the industry’s fears about judicial intervention have largely been 
avoided.  Legal challenges to the managed care industry have proven more 
difficult to win than expected. 
Even though judges have struggled with some aspects of managed care, the 
judicial decisions present a clear, overriding theme: courts are facilitating the 
market-based arrangements that drive managed care.  In most aspects of health 
care litigation, courts treat the health care field as they would any other 
industry.  This amounts to deference to prevailing market principles in health 
care delivery, as courts have shown no inclination to reflexively overturn 
market decisions.  The clearest evidence is in courts’ increasing deference to 
contractual arrangements, in physicians’ litigation against MCOs, and in 
antitrust cases where courts are not protecting MCOs from competitive forces 
in the health care market. 
 
 40. Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Establishing New Legal Doctrine in Managed 
Care: A Model of Judicial Response to Industrial Change, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 813 
(1999). 
 41. This section is borrowed liberally from JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT, supra 
note 38.  See also Peter D. Jacobson, Legal Challenges to Managed Care Cost Containment 
Programs: An Initial Assessment, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1999, at 69. 
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A second theme evident from the litigation is the slow development of 
MCO liability.  Neither physicians nor patients have been successful in directly 
contesting managed care practices.  Patients and physicians have brought a 
wide range of challenges to managed care’s cost containment programs, most 
of which have been unsuccessful.  For instance, patients have sued MCOs 
alleging negligence for injuries resulting from delayed or denied care or from 
the improper operation of financial incentives to limit care.  Primarily because 
of ERISA, these challenges have often been futile.  Even outside of ERISA, 
plaintiffs have not won a majority of cases.42 
Physicians have not fared much better in challenging MCO practices.  
Except for some inroads on fair procedures, courts have been unsympathetic to 
physician arguments.  Physicians have been primarily put at a disadvantage in 
liability challenges to MCO practices.  Largely because of ERISA, patient 
challenges in state courts to delayed or denied care have often been preempted, 
leaving the treating physician exposed to liability without being able to “share” 
responsibility with the MCO.  Also, courts have upheld the use of utilization 
review for controlling costs, especially under ERISA, regardless of the treating 
physician’s recommendation. 
Finally, courts are sending the message that restrictions on managed care 
innovations should be made by the legislatures, not by the courts.  In the 
ERISA cases, for example, judges have complained, at times vociferously, that 
ERISA preemption results in unjust outcomes preventing courts from holding 
MCOs accountable for their actions.43  Even so, judges have largely deferred to 
Congress to change ERISA preemption rather than judicially reinterpreting 
ERISA to achieve more equitable results.  As a general proposition, judges 
have determined that complaints about the organization and delivery of 
managed care should be resolved by elected officials.44 
Legislatures 
Since the courts punted to the elected officials, how have they responded?  
Not surprisingly, much of the backlash to managed care led to calls for tighter 
legislative and regulatory oversight.  At the federal level, the primary 
legislative debate has been over the proposed patients’ bill of rights.  In brief, 
such legislation would amend ERISA and permit patients to sue their MCO 
and states to regulate managed care.  Currently, ERISA doctrine acts to 
 
 42. For a more detailed empirical analysis of these trends, see Peter D. Jacobson et al., The 
Role of the Courts in Shaping Health Policy: An Empirical Analysis, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 278 
(2001). 
 43. See, e.g., Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 44. For a clear statement of that principle (and for the institutional reasons why courts should 
be reluctant to intervene), see Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 221-22 (2000).  In other words, 
courts have protected the market winner—MCOs.  In the fee-for-service era, courts also protected 
the market winner—but then it was the physicians. 
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preempt the application of state laws and state tort litigation to ERISA-covered 
employee benefit plans (“EBPs”).  Courts have uniformly held that MCOs are 
part of an EBP, and can, therefore, assert ERISA preemption.45  Despite 
repeated news reports of congressional compromise, the patients’ bill of rights 
has not been enacted as of this writing. 
At the state level, there has been much more legislation enacted.  However, 
because of ERISA preemption, it is difficult for states to predict which 
legislation will survive judicial scrutiny.46  In view of the continuing 
congressional stalemate, the likely venue for debates about regulating managed 
care will be in state legislatures. 
Motive.  Both patients and physicians are demanding greater accountability 
through legislative and regulatory oversight.  Since health care has traditionally 
been regulated at the state level, it makes sense that state legislatures will be 
active participants in determining managed care’s fate.  For re-election 
purposes, state legislators have an incentive to protect patients.  At the same 
time, legislators are highly influenced by the managed care industry’s lobbying 
clout. 
As a result, legislators’ motives for attacking managed care are quite 
mixed.  Thus, while neither Congress nor state legislators can ignore the 
backlash, the industry’s ability to block legislation (currently stronger in 
Congress than in state legislatures) suggests a continuing stalemate.  One way 
of responding would be for legislators to act by imposing benefit coverage 
mandates.  For example, thirteen state legislatures mandated that health 
insurers cover autologous bone marrow transplants with high dose 
chemotherapy (ABMT/HDC), despite disputed evidence of the procedure’s 
efficacy.  While not a direct attack on managed care, mandated benefits 
certainly limit the managed care industry’s ability to control costs by limiting 
benefit coverage. 
Opportunity.  There is little question that legislators, especially in 
Congress, have the opportunity to alter how managed care operates.  By 
amending ERISA, Congress could open MCOs to patient litigation for delayed 
or denied care and expand the reach of state legislative efforts.  For many 
reasons, the congressional patients’ rights debate has become more symbolic 
than of real consequence.  Although Congress has chosen not to amend 
ERISA, it has taken action on certain issues (often called legislation by body 
part).  For instance, Congress prohibited so-called drive-through deliveries by 
 
 45. For a more detailed explanation of ERISA preemption, see Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. 
Pomfret, ERISA Litigation and Physician Autonomy, 283 JAMA 921 (2000). 
 46. Compare, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (2002) (upholding 
a state law imposing an independent patient grievance process), with Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (barring punitive damages recovery). 
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mandating that women could not be discharged before forty-eight hours 
following delivery.47 
The picture is certainly different at the state level where MCOs face 
increasing scrutiny.  In many ways, the managed care backlash has been most 
evident in state-level attempts to control MCOs.  States have attempted to 
impose external grievance processes, which would allow patients to sue for 
delayed or denied care, or to require the disclosure of financial incentives.  
Early laws governing MCOs focused on the right of physicians to participate in 
MCO networks (so-called “any willing provider” laws), and on the right of 
physicians to discuss any aspect of care with their patients that related directly 
to managed care’s financial incentives (so-called “anti-gag” rules).  More 
recently, some states have imposed requirements mandating direct access to 
specialists.  Many states  limited managed care’s financial incentives by 
prohibiting incentives that would lead to the denial of medically necessary 
care.48  Some of these laws have gone into effect, but others have been 
preempted by ERISA. 
Take, for example, any willing provider (“AWP”) laws as a proxy for a 
range of state legislative attempts to regulate MCOs.  AWP laws would require 
MCOs to contract with any physician willing to meet the MCO’s established 
criteria.  These laws are intended to preserve patient choice of physician.  
MCOs oppose these laws because they eliminate at least one cost reduction 
mechanism—a managed care plan’s ability to choose physicians who will be 
willing to offer lower prices in return for guaranteed patient volume.  AWP 
laws affect another cost reduction mechanism, the power to control quality of 
care by restricting membership in the plan’s network to those physicians 
meeting rigorous quality standards.  Without the ability to select participating 
physicians based on cost and quality standards, MCOs argue that they cannot 
as easily monitor the quality of care.  Almost two dozen states have enacted 
such laws, but the courts are split as to whether ERISA preempts them.49  The 
Supreme Court agreed to resolve the split in the lower courts.50 
In sum, mixed motives resulted in limited exercise of the legislative 
opportunities to hold managed care accountable. 
 
 47. This type of legislative intervention has been heavily criticized.  See, e.g., David A. 
Hyman, Drive-through Deliveries: Is “Consumer Protection” Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 
N.C. L. REV. 5 (1999). 
 48. Tracy E. Miller, Managed Care Regulation, 278 JAMA 1102 (1997). 
 49. See, Tanya Albert, High Court Weighs Any-Willing-Provider Laws, AM. MED. NEWS, 
July 29, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_02/ 
gvl20729.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002). 
 50. Id. at 2. 
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The Media 
Any scrupulous murder investigation will turn its attention to a suspect that 
is known to have scrutinized, exposed, berated, vilified, and generally 
tormented the victim.  Newspapers, magazines, network and cable news 
reports, television programs, and even movies have led the charge to discredit 
managed care.  Could this outspoken critic be the guilty party? 
Motive.  It may be an overstatement to suggest that entertainment and 
broadcast media, particularly television and the movies, thrive on 
salaciousness, controversy, and creating a villain—but not by much.51  Not too 
long ago, one local television news broadcast attempted to downplay local 
crime and to focus on in-depth reports of local interest.  Ratings tanked, and 
the experiment ended quickly.  One reason is that crime and similar stories 
grab our attention, while softer features or serious investigative pieces tend to 
drift by largely unnoticed.52  Instead, media circuses such as the O.J. Simpson 
trial capture the public’s interest much more readily than most events.  Since 
the media do not publish or broadcast information for their own use or 
gratification, without the ability to hold readers and viewers, the media would 
cease to exist.  The motive?  Simple—ratings. 
In this kind of dog-eat-dog scenario, managed care provided everything the 
media needed to galvanize the public’s outrage.  Corporate profiteers, a 
plethora of tear-jerking human interest pieces, double-minded and double-
crossing politicians, a labyrinth of indecipherable regulations and legislation 
and physicians reduced to assembly-line medical bureaucrats all contributed 
mightily to wave upon wave of assaults on an embattled industry.53  Horror 
story after horror story decried managed care’s heartlessness, callousness, 
indifference and venality.  What the media forgot, or chose not to report, were 
managed care’s successes, along with why it replaced the fee-for-service 
system.  There has been little balance in media coverage of the industry. 
True, the managed care industry has served up plenty of material for a 
media group spurred on by the scent of blood.  So much so that the American 
Association of Health Plans (“AAHP”) recently retained a public relations firm 
to use its clout and influence for AAHP to obtain audiences with the power 
brokers of pop-culture.54  The public relations objective is to “offer itself as a 
resource on medical topics that may be interesting” and presumably influence 
the storyline in movies such as John Q and As Good as it Gets.55  The fact that 
 
 51. See Local TV News and Violence, MEDIASCOPE, at http://www.mediascope.org/ 
pubs.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2002). 
 52. See id. 
 53. Barbara Martinez, Tired of Being Cast as the Villain, HMOs Hire Talent Agency, WALL 
ST. J., July 9, 2002, at B1. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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the managed care industry as a whole spends its resources on a Hollywood 
talent agency for public relations spin instead of substantive quality and 
process improvement certainly confirms that it, at least, believes the media has 
a motive for murder.  Indeed, the industry may have waited too long to unleash 
a media counter-attack. 
Opportunity.  The media helped set the policy agenda.  As a vast enterprise 
with the ability to keep a story alive for as long as it wants, the media can 
create a groundswell of interest that can be disproportionate to the seriousness 
of the event.  Witness the frenzy over the O.J. Simpson trial.  On the other 
hand, media attention to a particular problem can be beneficial in forcing 
politicians to respond to social problems or in holding public officials and 
corporate executives accountable.  A good example is the recent focus on 
corporate greed and the resulting legislation.  In short, the media has an 
extraordinary opportunity through its vast reach, repetition via multiple media, 
and attention-getting headlines to slay managed care or to adulate it. 
However, that same focus can be destructive, as with the emphasis on 
managed care’s failures while ignoring its successes.  Even assuming that the 
horror stories are true, the question is one of balance and perspective.  Out of 
the millions of patient encounters, it is not surprising that a few result in bad 
outcomes or that the industry acts in bad faith.  Yet how representative are the 
horror stories and how much media play do they deserve?  To what extent are 
the horror stories evidence of systematic failures or merely aberrations that 
deserve, at best, only brief media attention?  How should those instances be 
weighed against the many encounters that result in appropriate outcomes with 
overall reduced costs? 
Of equal concern to industry and patients alike, the media message may be 
fragmented, with sectors portraying the same facts differently, and not always 
correctly.  An example is the media response to a report on research on the 
length of physicians’ visits under managed care versus traditional financing 
methods.  The original published report surprisingly revealed empirical 
evidence that “[t]he average time physicians spend with patients increased 
during a period in which managed care penetration grew.”56  This finding 
contradicted commonly held beliefs by physicians and the public about 
managed care physicians spending far too little time with their patients.  
Distressingly, the media coverage was woefully inadequate and sometimes 
inaccurate, even though the authors conclude that the overall media coverage 
was credible. 
 
 56. David Mechanic & Donna D. McAlpine, “Fifteen Minutes of Fame”: Reflections on the 
Uses of Health Research, the Media, Pundits, and the Spin, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 
211.  The original findings were reported in David Mechanic et al., Are Patients’ Office Visits 
with Physicians Getting Shorter?, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198 (2001). 
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Some reporters who wrote stories for local newspapers got the facts wrong. 
Stories adapted from these reports further disseminated these errors. . . .  In the 
case of one medical publication, we twice reviewed its coverage for accuracy 
and provided factual corrections.  The final copy included this medical editor’s 
note: 
“It should be emphasized that managed care has resulted in an increase in 
the administrative aspects of patient care, and the time required to do these 
administrative tasks may contribute to less time actually spent with the 
patient but more time spent on the patient’s records.” 
We informed the publication that this statement was inconsistent with the 
AMA data reported in the paper; the writer responded that “I know what you 
are saying is that the data does not uphold his comment, but I am going to 
leave it in there as an editor’s note, because it is in his experience.”57 
Although the industry has been on the defensive because of the selective 
reporting of managed care, the industry is fully capable of using the media to 
manipulate public opinion.  One way is to place advertisements that shape the 
policy environment.  For example, the famous “Harry and Louise” campaign 
played a large role in defeating the Clinton Administration’s proposed Health 
Security Act (“HSA”) in 1994.  In this public relations effort, the Health 
Insurance Association of America (“HIAA”) produced an advertising 
campaign to derail the HSA.  The ad showed a couple pouring over the details 
of the HSA and becoming increasingly concerned that the government would 
dictate their health care choices.  The ad simultaneously elevated the ability of 
the market to provide the most effective health care system and demonized 
governmental efforts to regulate the market.  As a media event, it succeeded 
brilliantly.58  Many news reports covered the ad, repeatedly and widely 
showing it and discussing its content.  At a minimum, it contributed 
significantly to the HSA’s demise.59  At the same time, it had the unintended 
 
 57. Mechanic & McAlpine, supra note 55, at 213.  See also Theodore R. Marmor, A Summer 
of Discontent: Press Coverage of Murder and Medical Care Reform, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & 
L. 495, 501 (1995) (noting that “[t]he nation’s political reporters know relatively little about 
health care issues” and permitted the creation of media stars opposed to health care reform to 
offer their views without adequate scrutiny). 
 58. For an empirical argument that the ad campaign reversed public opinion away from 
trends unfavorable to the insurance industry, see Raymond L. Goldsteen et al., Harry and Louise 
and Health Care Reform: Romancing Public Opinion, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1325 
(2001).  For a skeptical view of the empirical evidence, see Mollyann Brodie, Impact of Issue 
Advertisements and the Legacy of Harry and Louise, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1353 (2001).  
Brodie, nevertheless, agrees about the general impact of the ad campaign, at least in changing 
how the debate was framed. 
 59. This successful strategy is likely to be emulated in future health policy battles, such as 
debates over patients’ rights and pharmaceutical benefits.  See, e.g., Jennifer Schecter, The Return 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] WHO KILLED MANAGED CARE? 387 
consequence of overselling the market’s ability to provide high quality health 
care at low cost.  In turn, the overselling contributed to managed care’s travails 
when it was unable to perform as anticipated. 
Another way is to hire public relations firms to burnish the industry’s 
image.  According to published reports, the industry’s public relations effort 
will focus on two complementary strategies.60  The first will be to build 
bridges with movie and television scriptwriters to influence how the scripts 
portray managed care industry.  The second will be to blame others, especially 
attorneys, for managed care’s perceived deficiencies.61 
One further caveat remains regarding the media.  By the time the various 
interest groups, from industry representatives to pop culture panderers, get 
through with their treatment of the subject, the public may only be left with 
more confusion and a general sense of distrust and discontent.  As a result, the 
opportunity to kill managed care may not be as clear-cut as initially suspected. 
Health Insurers 
What a perfect suspect health insurance companies make.  They were the 
suppliers of what had become a commonplace employment benefit—health 
insurance—and had seemingly limitless resources to topple a competing 
industry.  Also, managed care indisputably surpassed health insurance as a 
health care financing plan.  Yet, in this murder mystery, can we take anything 
simplistic at face value?  More importantly, there are many overlapping 
interests that the competitors share, so that protecting one would inevitably 
help the other.  For instance, both have an interest in avoiding state benefit 
mandates. 
Health insurance benefits had become a method for employers to attract 
employees during wage controls after World War II.  By the 1980s, they were 
a familiar employee benefit, and insurance companies profitably marketed 
indemnity products far and wide.  Many factors, not the least of which was 
technological advances in medicine, brought about year after year of increased 
premium costs and, with them, pressure from all sides to stop the rapid rate of 
increases.  The ideas of nationalizing and reforming the U.S. health care 
delivery and financing system, including the ill-fated Clinton plan, were 
soundly trounced on several occasions, in no small part due to insurance 
industry efforts.  This left the private sector free to organize and deliver health 
care. 
 
of Harry and Louise, MULTINAT’L MONITOR, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 35, available at 
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm1998/mm9801.11.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2002). 
 60. CNN.com/Health, Health Care Group Hires Hollywood Agent to Improve Its Image, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/07/13/hmo.pr.ap (last visited July 13, 2002). 
 61. Id.  “Instead of attacking the film, the AAHP bought ads deflecting the focus of anger 
from insurance plans to ‘a runaway litigation system and expensive government regulations.’”  Id. 
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However, by this time, commercial (indemnity) health insurers were in 
decline, largely supplanted by MCOs.  For a variety of reasons, large 
employers have shifted their coverage toward managed care.  That leaves 
commercial insurers with a much riskier and less lucrative market for small 
employers and individual policyholders. 
Insurance companies often transformed their product lines into managed 
care products and themselves into managed care companies.  Frequently, 
managed care companies were born out of the decline of traditional insurance 
companies.  In many instances, they became for-profit MCOs, particularly in 
California.62  Thus, the managed care landscape became populated with 
insurance companies in a new role.  Just as we asked doctors to act like 
insurance companies in accepting risk through capitation, we have asked 
insurance companies to act like doctors in combining the insurance and clinical 
aspects in one corporate entity.  Neither plan has worked very well.  However, 
it does deflate the evidence that insurers perpetrated the murder, since, as it 
turns out, many have come to reap the monetary benefits of managed care. 
Hospitals 
During managed care’s ascendancy, it seems fair to suggest that hospitals 
got run over.  As managed care entities grew in size and scope, hospitals had 
little negotiating leverage in rates they could charge.  Hospitals were 
dependent on managed care for patient referrals, thereby limiting hospital 
administrators’ abilities to negotiate over fees. 
Although MCOs still hold the balance of power, times have changed.  
Since the late 1990s, hospitals have gained negotiating leverage and are able to 
demand higher reimbursement rates.  Under pressure to close unneeded beds 
and to streamline operations, the number of hospitals has declined by nine 
percent (9%) since 1990, even as the population has increased.63  Some 
facilities have closed, but others have consolidated into larger chains, 
equivalent in size and power to MCOs.  Not surprisingly, the hospital chains, 
which control large numbers of beds in many markets, are demanding and 
receiving a higher price for their services.64 
It seems unlikely that hospitals set out to kill managed care.  After all, 
hospitals are still dependent on MCOs for patients.  Yet it seems highly likely 
 
 62. Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Managed Competition and California’s Health 
Care Economy, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1996, at 39.  See also Robinson, supra note 5, at 2623. 
 63. Joseph Weber & John Cady, The New Power Play in Health Care, BUS. WK., Jan. 28, 
2002, at 90; Barbara Martinez, With New Muscle, Hospitals Squeeze Insurers on Rates, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 12, 2002, at A1.  Both articles document instances where hospitals forced MCOs to pay 
higher rates in showdowns. 
 64. Martinez, supra note 63, at A1.  According to Martinez, two hospitals in Cleveland, 
Ohio control sixty-eight percent (68%) of the beds, while one hospital system in Grand Rapids, 
Michigan controls seventy percent (70%).  Id. 
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that hospitals “piled on” once the decline set in.  After years of rates that 
squeezed hospital revenues and services, hospital administrators responded in 
ways that were designed to provide greater negotiating power.  That their 
subsequent success further damaged MCOs’ ability to control costs offers little 
evidence of murder.65  It may reflect opportunism, but that is the American 
way. 
The Managed Care Industry 
One by one, the investigation has carefully scrutinized each of the possible 
murderers, eventually raising questions about motive or opportunity for each 
and every one.  Where, then, to turn?  At first glance, it seems rather silly to 
implicate the managed care industry itself.  What motive for self-destruction 
could it possibly harbor, given what one managed care executive calls the 
“[unfulfilled] promise of managed care”?66  To be sure, the industry 
overpromised what it could achieve, but there is nothing unusual or untoward 
about creating high, and even unrealistic, expectations. 
Managed Care as a Concept.  In fact, managed care as a concept is a good 
idea.  Conceptually, combining the financing and clinical functions into one 
entity as a mechanism for saving costs and improving quality makes sense.  
Managed care’s cost containment programs were offered as a needed 
corrective to the excesses of the fee-for-service system.  In the ideal construct, 
balancing access to care with cost controls is imperative in view of the reality 
of scarce resources.  Indeed, any system that replaces managed care will still 
need to confront the reality of scarce resources.  In addition, managed care’s 
desired focus on evidence-based medicine to guide clinical decisions offered a 
sound basis for determining whether care should be provided to an individual 
patient.  Furthermore, the industry’s stated emphasis on prevention and 
improving quality of care were welcome innovations in health care delivery. 
Initially, managed care delivered many of its promises.  For many years, its 
cost containment programs reduced the rate of increase in health care costs.  
As noted earlier, many scholars have concluded that managed care quality is 
roughly equivalent to fee-for-service medicine.  And the industry has steadily 
improved on providing preventive care to its members and, in many instances, 
to the community at-large.  Over time, however, managed care was unable to 
restrain cost increases, as double-digit health insurance premium increases 
 
 65. At the Symposium, Professor Nicolas Terry observed that pharmaceutical manufacturers 
also pursued strategies that helped undermine managed care’s ability to control costs.  For 
example, the direct-to-consumer marketing effort has clearly raised the cost of providing 
prescription drugs by helping to eviscerate tolerance of pharmaceutical formularies designed to 
restrict which drugs can be prescribed.  See, e.g., Vanessa O’Connell, FDA Survey Says Doctors 
Often Prescribe the Brands Consumers Name from Ads, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at B4. 
 66. Glenn Howatt, Brainerd Takes the Helm at HealthPartners, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., 
May 5, 2002, at 1D. 
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have returned.  The horror stories undermined the industry’s claims of 
combining quality improvements and access to care. 
Implementation.  What went wrong?  Although there is no scholarly 
agreement as to why managed care failed to meet its promise, several reasons 
seem plausible.  To begin with, the concept was not implemented very well.  
Patients and physicians were needlessly antagonized.  Published reports of 
high salaries for executives amid demands for cost controls did nothing to 
enhance the concept’s credibility.  Repeatedly, the industry allowed the 
perception to fester that it was more interested in managing costs than in 
providing care—a perception of profits over care that fueled patient suspicions 
of rampant conflicts of interest.  The industry failed to educate patients about 
the concept of managed care and the need to control costs, and it failed to 
include patients in determining how cost containment would operate.  For 
instance, patients were rarely told about why a treatment recommendation was 
denied and were rarely granted a grievance process to review the denial.  A 
supporter of the concept captured the scope of this failure, as follows: 
HMOs are not helpless victims of the managed care backlash.  Rather, at times 
they seem to be their own worst enemies. . . . Some health plans have 
needlessly antagonized physicians in their cost control efforts rather than try to 
find ways to win their cooperation in an effort to improve quality while 
reducing costs.  Many have done a poor job of recognizing and responding to 
reasonable and legitimate consumer and patient concerns.  Although this 
behavior is not true of all health plans and not always true of any of them, such 
resistance, lack of responsiveness, and antagonistic behavior reflect negatively 
on the industry.67 
Equally important, the industry failed to accept accountability for its role 
in clinical decisions.68  At this point, the managed care industry has not 
demonstrated a willingness to hold itself accountable for its products and, there 
is no legal or political constraint on its activities.  The case of Maio v. Aetna69 
is indicative and instructive of the lack of accountability.  Aetna elected to 
defend a legal challenge to its managed care operations by asserting that public 
statements touting its primary commitment to quality of health care were 
“mere puffery.”70  Translated from the technical language of the law, the 
essence of Aetna’s defense was that reasonable consumers would understand 
that its avowed commitment to quality was a statement of opinion not intended 
 
 67. Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Unrealistic Expectations Born of Defective 
Institutions, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 931, 935-36 (1999). 
 68. This analysis is borrowed from a more extensive examination in JACOBSON STRANGERS 
IN THE NIGHT, supra note 38. 
 69. 221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 70. Id. at 479. 
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to be relied upon or to convey anything factual about its managed care plans.71  
Regardless of the merits of Aetna’s legal argument, a voluntary 
characterization of public and repeated commitments to quality medical care as 
“mere puffery” seems an unusual way to represent one of managed care’s core 
functions.  It is ironic that when quality of care is perhaps the central issue 
concerning public attitudes toward managed care, one of the industry’s major 
players simply discounts its own stated commitment to high quality care.  Maio 
exposes the absence of voluntary accountability. 
Reacting to Maio, a prominent health law scholar argued that 
such advertising provides a weak basis for a consumer class action.  If such 
advertising works at all, it is most likely to attract healthy rather than unhealthy 
subscribers . . . . It is simply too much to expect competing health plans to pay 
special attention to quality when it is clearly against their commercial interests 
to do so.72 
As far as it goes, that may be accurate.  Yet the dismissiveness of the false 
advertising claims betrays the effects of the false advertising on an individual 
patient.  The managed care industry is also likely to argue that Maio is a trivial 
example and not indicative of the industry’s overall commitment to quality 
health care.  Perhaps so.  Yet Aetna’s stance in that case was certainly 
consistent with a philosophy that puts patients a distant second to other 
considerations.73  Moreover, this is not the only time when the industry’s 
public posture was at odds with its private actions.  The incongruity between 
public statements and private decisions further exposes the accountability gap. 
Equally important, Maio is symptomatic of a larger failure to provide 
adequate information to the public.  Maintaining a market-based health care 
system requires that patients have adequate access to information that allows 
them to make an informed decision about the type and amount of health care to 
purchase.  A fundamental flaw in the market approach in health care is the 
patient’s inability to judge the quality of health care.  Deliberately depicting a 
commitment to quality of care in terms that an MCO has no intention of 
upholding may be nothing more than puffery in the law and may not amount to 
false and deceptive advertising.  Nevertheless, it certainly undermines the 
rationale for a self-regulated market-driven system that proponents have 
offered.  The managed care industry conveys to the public and to political 
 
 71. Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other “Loophole” Claims: How the Law’s “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & COM. 49 (1998). 
 72. Clark C. Havighurst, Consumers Versus Managed Care: The New Class Actions, 
HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2001, at 8, 15-16. 
 73. In response to patients’ claims for access to payer databases to substantiate promises of 
quality of care and to determine whether physician reimbursements were adequate, Aetna’s 
attorney was quoted as saying that granting access would be “abusive, oppressive, and 
overreaching.”  Catherine Wilson, Lawsuits Pending on Managed Care, TALLAHASSEE 
DEMOCRAT, July 17, 2002, at E10. 
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officials that it shares professional values in ways that differ from those of 
other sellers in several key dimensions.  In contrast, the defense of mere 
puffery about commitment to quality strikes at the heart of the managed care 
enterprise and the social contract between the managed care industry and the 
public. 
Managed Care as an Industry.  These implementation failures have been 
compounded by an industry-wide strategy, reflected in the major trade 
association’s policies, that is largely about image management.  The American 
Association of Health Plans (“AAHP”) was created in 1995 from a merger of 
two managed care/insurance organizations and quickly became the voice of 
this burgeoning industry.  Its stated mission is “to advance health care quality 
and affordability through leadership in the health care community, advocacy 
and the provision of services to member health plans,”74 but it focuses much of 
its activities on lobbying and public relations management as opposed to 
“advancing quality.” 
As managed care took off, it was concurrently praised for putting a lid on 
runaway expenditures and vilified for restricting care and physician payments.  
The AAHP’s response to much of the criticism and proposed patients’ rights 
legislation has been like that of a recalcitrant child—just say no.75  Take, for 
example, AAHP’s response to a survey finding that one in seven could not get 
needed healthcare services, regardless of their insurance status.76  AAHP 
ascribed the decline in access that occurred during this period of managed care 
market penetration to “some providers . . . contracting with fewer insurers, and 
others [being] too overwhelmed to take new patients.  Changes in employer-
sponsored plans also mean that a favorite doctor or hospital could be dropped 
from the patient’s network.”77  AAHP seems to suggest that the inability to get 
medical care when needed has nothing to do with managed care restrictions.  
Instead, it is caused by physicians who refuse large numbers of patients and 
patients who are not sick enough to justify being overly selective about the 
doctor they see. 
After successfully contributing to the defeat of the Clinton plan for 
healthcare reform, the industry, the HIAA,78 and AAHP have doggedly fought 
 
 74. American Association of Health Plans, Who We Are, at http://www.aahp.org/ 
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any attempt to take an incremental approach to reforming the system, without 
offering any alternative to the status quo.  As early as 1996, AAHP attempted 
to obfuscate the public cry to give patients an appeals process and to provide 
an escape route from pre-authorizations and non-covered emergency services.  
The organization sought to preempt legislation by launching a “Putting 
Patients First Initiative” that included voluntary member guidelines and no 
enforcement provisions whatsoever for their one thousand member MCOs.79  
Critics characterized the initiative as a way to avoid more stringent legislative 
and political oversight.80  As one critic noted, “It is based on the faulty premise 
that there are not really any problems with managed care—only confusion 
resulting from anti-managed care misinformation—and asserts that the answer 
lies merely in health plans holding themselves accountable.”81 
At the same time, AAHP vigorously opposed “prudent layperson” 
legislation that would codify a patient’s right to obtain treatment outside the 
plan in emergency situations.  Despite the commitment to voluntary grievance 
procedures, AAHP has opposed state legislation mandating them and has 
supported legal challenges to such laws even when the voluntary approach 
showed few results.82  The managed care industry has consistently opposed 
similar federal legislation even though AAHP’s studies have concluded that 
independent reviews are relatively infrequent and about half of the cases 
reviewed by independent reviewers confirm the insurers’ medical decisions.83 
Faced with the possibility of Congress granting physicians the right to 
bargain collectively with MCOs, AAHP decried the initiative.  Somewhat 
disingenuously, AAHP does not claim that this right would be problematic for 
MCOs negotiating with large powerful physician groups.  The stated concern 
is only for the “working families” and the increased cost and reduced quality 
that would result from collective bargaining by physicians.84 
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 83. See Michael Milt Pretzer, The Case for Less Regulation of Managed Care, MED. ECON., 
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Denying that United Healthcare’s move to discontinue preauthorization requirements was in 
response to the threat of patients’ rights legislation, AAHP’s Susan Pisano attributed it to “the 
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I am hard pressed to find a meaningful, constructive dialogue taking place 
that includes managed care industry organizations.  While the managed care 
industry fights legislation, regulations, and public opinion that call for 
managed care reform and accountability, the industry is very open to 
legislation that benefits their members.  Amidst AAHP roadblocks to patients’ 
rights, the organization’s calls for limits on litigation and added Medicare 
prescription drug benefits can be heard.  All of these examples demonstrate the 
industry’s oppositional, protectionist approach. 
THE VERDICT 
Each of the actors had either motive or opportunity to kill managed care.  
Yet each also had what amounts to an alibi.  Either the motive was mixed or 
the opportunity to act was limited.  At first glance, the most obvious 
conclusion would be that each actor contributed to what might be considered 
death by a thousand cuts.  There is much to support this outcome, since it 
seems undeniable that actions taken by each of the suspects contributed in 
some way to managed care’s travails.  This conclusion is also convenient for 
each of the players because they can avoid blame.  Each can legitimately say  
“I didn’t do it—you can’t attribute managed care’s death to me.  ‘X’s’ 
contribution was much more significant than mine.  Sure, I played a role, but I 
was just protecting my own interests.  I had no desire to sabotage managed 
care.”  In this sense, each actor played a necessary, but not alone sufficient, 
role in killing managed care. 
Yet that verdict seems wrong to me because one of the participants above 
all is complicit.  I conclude that the primary perpetrator was the managed care 
industry itself, a result of failures from within.  Through self-inflicted wounds, 
the industry self-destructed.  To be sure, implacable opposition and political 
interference from outside beset the industry and made survival a difficult 
challenge.  In this context, the fate of managed care has many similarities to  
The Perfect Storm.85  This popular book and subsequent film depicted the story 
of three different and distinct weather patterns that converged to create a storm 
of power and destruction that was far greater than the aggregate of the 
individual storms.  By analogy to that story, the howling wind from the north 
was simultaneous pressure from employers/purchasers who wanted relief from 
soaring costs and from employees/patients who wanted options and choices.  
The gale from the south was patient dissatisfaction that manifested itself in the 
form of thunderous opposition.  Finally, the hurricane from the east was 
 
next stage in the evolution of health care, the edge of a wave of change.”  Freudenheim, supra 
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physician dissatisfaction that set off hardball negotiating strategies with deep 
antagonism toward MCOs.  With high hopes the ship Andrea Gail sailed into 
the vortex of the 1991 convergence of three storms, just as the advent of 
managed care converged with high public policy hopes and expectations of 
providing high-quality health care while controlling costs. 
The captain and crew of the Andrea Gail did not intend or anticipate being 
killed any more than managed care intended to be a victim.  The visionaries 
and innovators of managed care saw an organizational form that would rely on 
the power of the marketplace to integrate the financing and delivery functions 
of health services.  Unfortunately, the implementation failed to achieve these 
goals without alienating too many stakeholders.  Perhaps the expectations were 
too great, and the window for success too narrow, but the poor implementation 
of managed care unwittingly created the opportunity to fall victim to itself. 
Certainly, the other suspects contributed to the mauling, making it difficult 
for the industry to overcome its mistakes.  At a minimum, these suspects 
hastened managed care’s demise.  Physicians and patients clearly aided and 
abetted the demise.  There is little question that neither group will be mourning 
at the funeral.  Politicians contributed by constantly threatening to intervene 
and focusing unwanted attention on the industry’s shortcomings, though the 
courts were, surprisingly, largely bystanders.  Hospitals continued the pressure 
by ratcheting up their fees, and employers succumbed to employee demands 
for greater choice in health care coverage.  Indeed, employers squandered the 
opportunity to hold MCOs and employees to the cost-access tradeoff.  
Moreover, the media played a central role as handmaidens to the slaughter by 
overplaying the horror stories and not reporting on managed care’s successes. 
Managed care could, nevertheless, have overcome the combined 
contributions of its detractors.  It offered a good concept at the right time.  The 
country was looking for ways to reduce health care costs without sacrificing 
quality of care, and managed care offered the conceptual model to accomplish 
those objectives.  Yet, the design was poorly implemented, with little regard 
for legitimate patient and physician complaints.  The industry’s “just say no” 
response to criticism is eerily reminiscent of how the tobacco industry 
responded to mounting scientific evidence of the harms its products caused.  In 
both cases, the industry failed to adapt to public discontent, resulting in 
vilification and a public backlash.  To that extent, managed care’s death did not 
occur as a result of natural causes. 
The Implications 
Future health care historians may well look back and see managed care as 
a transition between the fee-for-service system and an entirely new way of 
delivering and financing health care.  Whatever managed care’s current 
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problems, it seems premature to declare that it is dead.  It is certainly in retreat 
and may well be on life-supports, but it is not dead yet.86  In either case, 
policymakers will need to address several questions: Is it worth resuscitating?  
If so, what will it take to revive it?  If not, what will replace it? 
Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this article.  My short 
answers are as follows.  First, it is worth saving managed care because the 
concept is sound and the implementation failures can be addressed.  Second, 
the industry needs to reverse its  “just say no” strategy and embrace public 
accountability.  This would include a strong, expedient, and independent 
grievance process to resolve challenges to delayed or denied care.  Individual 
MCOs should also welcome a patient advisory board with meaningful 
oversight of cost containment strategies, along with providing a patients’ rights 
advocate.  Above all, the managed care industry needs to educate patients and 
physicians about why cost control is imperative and how cost containment 
decisions are made.87 
As for the future, let me note that the cost-quality-access tradeoffs at the 
heart of managed care will remain regardless of what replaces it.  Whatever 
replaces managed care will confront the same policy conflicts present at the 
dawn of the managed care era—patient demands for access to increasingly 
expensive care and insurer demands to control those very costs.  At present, 
there is no obvious successor waiting to take managed care’s place.  Shifting to 
a fully private system is as unlikely as replacing managed care with universal 
health coverage.  All indications are that, in the short-term, more and more of 
the health insurance burden will be shifted to individuals.  Employers are 
shifting from defined benefit to defined contribution programs, which will 
increase employees’ out-of-pocket health care expenditures. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have taken a somewhat irreverent look at the current state 
of the health care delivery system in the United States, but this parlous 
situation is a very serious matter.  For health care affects all of us, and the 
current sturm und drang is unsettling for all but the wealthiest citizens who can 
still afford private health insurance.  Whether it is the high cost of health care 
or the absence of health insurance, something is terribly amiss in the system.  
My fear is that it will get much worse before the political system will be forced 
to develop solutions. 
 
 86. In this sense, the managed care industry most resembles the Ottoman Empire during its 
decline at the beginning of the 20th century when it was widely referred to as “the sick man of 
Europe.”  See LORD KINROSS, OTTOMAN CENTURIES: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TURKISH 
EMPIRE  (1977). 
 87. As one participant in the Symposium noted: managed care was designed to ration health 
care, but never told the public how it would be done.  Now that we know, we don’t like it! 
